What it proves
PRE-GEN is permission before generation, and evidence of it, among the services that choose to ask. It does not stop services that never ask, and it does not decide whether a use is lawful.
| Say | Do not say |
|---|---|
| "We query PRE-GEN before generation and keep the signed decisions and receipts." | "PRE-GEN guarantees the use is lawful." "Nobody can generate this likeness anymore." |
What each object proves
| Object | Proves | Does not prove |
|---|---|---|
Answer (pg.answer.v1) | This registry gave this status to this exact request (request_id), under this profile, valid for at most 900 seconds | That the output matched the job; that the use is lawful |
Report and acknowledgement (pg.report.v1, pg.report_ack.v1) | The provider said it generated the output with this SHA-256, and the registry received that report at received_at | That the report is true |
Proof bundle (pg.proof.v1) | For each subject: a valid allow when generation began, a report naming this file, acknowledged within 24 hours of the answer's expiry | That the use is lawful; anything about a file whose hash differs |
| Decision (earlier interface, /v1) | This registry gave this answer to this exact request, at that time, unchanged since | That a licence exists; that the output matched the request; that the use is lawful |
| Licence (earlier interface, /v1) | The subject's key and the registry's key signed these terms | Under managed custody, the subject's own act: the registry holds the key |
| Receipt (earlier interface, /v1) | The provider reported producing this output under this decision | That the report is true; that every generation was reported |
| Observation (earlier interface, /v1) | The provider reported a use that needed no licence | That the use happened as reported; anything granted |
| Audit log (earlier interface, /v1) | An event is included under a root timestamped outside the registry | That the log is complete; that what it records is true |
| Registry directory | Which registry may issue which codes, signed by the steward key | Any right over a person or a work |
Refusals and opt-outs
- An opt-out has priority over every licence in the registry that holds it. Under the identity extension, a client that finds the same person, confirmed on their own channel, in several registries applies a refusal from any of them.
- A new opt-out waits 14 days at PRAMPTA before it takes effect, because anyone claiming authority can file one. The subject's owner can pause the subject immediately.
- From its effective time every new decision refuses. A decision issued earlier stays usable until it expires (300 seconds at PRAMPTA); a cached allow never outlives its expiry.
- Every answer about a subject, refusals included, is a signed answer you can keep. A request the registry cannot authenticate gets HTTP 401 (
PG_NOT_AUTHENTICATEDon/v2/requests,invalid_credentialon/v1/verify), which is not signed. PG_UNKNOWN_SUBJECT(PG_NO_SUBJECTon /v1) is not a prohibition. It says only that this registry does not know the subject; the user may hold rights it does not record. Decide under your own policy, and do not present the output as licensed by that registry.
What to say plainly
- Systems that never ask — offline, open-weight or non-integrated models — are outside the protocol.
- Recognition is the provider's job. Authorization is asked for a named subject; resemblance, style or composites without a name are not caught by PRE-GEN.
- Managed custody (the reference registry today): consent rests on the registry's records, not on a key the subject holds.
- A false allow from a compromised registry cannot be independently confirmed or ruled out without a verifiable licence and a trusted subject key.
- One registry in production today (PRAMPTA). Codes from several registries never collide. When a provider knows two registries hold the same person and they disagree, neither answer decides by itself; the provider keeps both and does not call the output licensed while a refusal is unresolved. For a public person with anchors, the identity rule decides instead: only claims the person confirmed count; a person has one home registry, and two confirmed homes are a duplicate in which the stricter answer decides. Registries that declare the identity extension publish anchors (
GET /v2/anchors) that tell a provider when two registries hold the same person; PRAMPTA does not publish them yet. - A listing is not a rights check. The steward admits and can revoke registries; whether each rights holder is genuine is the registry's responsibility. The decision's
subject_authoritysays how well the registry established it: onlyverifiedmeans the registry checked identity and authority. - C2PA: the signed assertion exists, but an end-to-end C2PA integration has not been tested.
- Licences are sold at PRAMPTA at prices the rights holder sets. Decisions and receipts work the same whether or not a licence was bought.